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ANTITRUST REVIEW
The fact that the ARCO conspiracy was vertical while the Trial Law-
yers case involved a horizontal arrangement is insignificant. As Justice
Stevens points out in hisARCO dissent, the result inARCO should be the
same if the conspiracy not to charge more than a specified maximum
price were horizontal among all of the ARCO dealers and not vertically
imposed by their common supplier."0 5 In either case, the competitive
injury, or absence thereof, would be the same, and thus they should re-
ceive the same treatment from the law. Indeed, Justice Brennan's argu-
ment that "[l]ow prices benefit consumers regardless of how those prices
are set, and so long as they are above predatory levels, they do not
threaten competition"" 6 applies both to horizontal as well as vertical
arrangements.
One cannot read ARCO without wondering whether the majority of
the Justices really believe that, as a matter of substantive law, the per se
rule ought to apply to a vertical maximum price-fixing scheme but are
unwilling to come right out and say so by overruling Albrecht. More
significantly, the case may signal acceptance by the Court's majority of
an antitrust outlook that focuses on consumer welfare as the Alpha and
Omega of Sherman-Act concern and permits restraints that are not likely
to injure consumers somewhere down the road. There certainly is
enough language in the ARCO opinion to support such a conclusion.
CONCLUSION
It might be good public policy to limit the ambit of per se antitrust
doctrine to anticompetitive conduct that is highly likely to injure con-
sumers. And it might be equally good policy to permit underpaid public
defenders to use coercive pressure to persuade their governmental cus-
tomers to raise their rates of pay-particularly when the D.C. Superior
Court lawyers, had they been employees of the Legal Aid Society, could
have gone on strike without any antitrust concern. In confronting these
troubling policy issues, I fear that Trial Lawyers and ARCO have pro-
duced results that are difficult to rationalize. Whether that is because the
Justices do not have small minds and consistency would have been fool-
ish I leave to the reader.
FUNCTIONAL DISCOUNTS AFTER TExAco v HASEROUCK
by Richard M. Steuer 1
IN Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, the much-maligned Robinson-Patman
Act-that pariah of antitrust---came face to face with the Supreme
105. See id. at 1900 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 1892.
107. Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York.
108. 110 S. Ct. 2535 (1990). The author's law firm represented Texaco before the
Supreme Court.
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Court for the first time in seven years. In years past, commentators have
called for the abolition of this law, terming it, among other things, "ob-
structive,,,"o "pernicious""o and "perverse. ' '1  The Court's objective
in Hasbrouck, however, was confined to correcting a renegade ruling by
the Ninth Circuit that jeopardized the continued existence of wholesaling
as we know it. To understand the Court's holding, it is essential to un-
derstand the import of the Ninth Circuit's later-reversed ruling.
Texaco sold gasoline at three price levels in the area of Spokane,
Washington in the 1970s. First, it sold directly to independent retailers,
including Mr. Hasbrouck, who operated service stations under the Tex-
aco trademark. Second, it sold to Dompier Oil Company, which func-
tioned originally as a wholesaler and later as both a wholesaler and a
retailer. Dompier resold to independent retailers operating under the
Texaco trademark, and later began reselling directly to the public
through stations that it owned and that also were operated under the
Texaco trademark. Texaco charged Dompier between 3.95 and 3.65
cents less than the price paid by Hasbrouck and the other independent
retailers. 12 Although Dompier operated a small bulk storage facility,
the Court found that it usually delivered gasoline directly from Texaco to
the retail stations, for which Texaco paid it an additional hauling fee.113
The third price level at which Texaco sold gasoline applied to another
customer, Gull Oil Company. Gull sold directly to the public through
retail service stations operated by third-party contractors under the
"Gull" trademark. 14 Texaco charged Gull four to six cents less than the
price Hasbrouck paid.115
The Texaco stations supplied by Dompier regularly sold Texaco brand
gasoline to the public at lower prices than Hasbrouck and the other Tex-
aco stations that were supplied directly by Texaco. This caught the at-
tention of Mr. Hasbrouck and the other independent retailers, and
ultimately that group filed suit. The case was tried before a jury. 16 The
plaintiffs demonstrated that Texaco had granted wholesale discounts to
109. Baxter, Vertical Practices - Half Slave, Half Free, 52 Antitrust L.J. 743, 754
(1983).
110. R. Bork, The Antitrust Paradox 382 (1978).
111. R. Posner, Antitrust Law 62 n.35 (1976). See generally ABA Antitrust Section
Monograph No. 4, The Robinson-Patman Act: Policy and Law Volume I at 27-37
(1980) (critically examining the Robinson-Patman Act).
112. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2539 (1990).
113. See id. at 2540.
114. The stations were owned by third party operators, but Gull retained title to the
gasoline until it was sold to the consumer. See id. at 2539.
115. See id.
116. The case actually was tried twice. The first jury found against Texaco, but the
district court granted Texaco judgment notwithstanding the verdict on the ground that it
was improper to award what amounted to "automatic" damages by simply calculating
the amount of the "overcharge" to the dealers. Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court
confirmed the correctness of the district court's analysis in J. Truett Payne Co. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp., 451 U.S. 557, 567-68 (1981). The Ninth Circuit overruled the
district court's grant of judgment notwithstanding the verdict, but remanded for a new
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Dompier and Gull, and asserted that as a consequence they had lost busi-
ness to the retailers that Dompier and Gull supplied. 1 7 Thejury agreed,
and returned a verdict for the plaintiffs that was trebled to $1,349,700. 18
The Ninth Circuit affirmed.' 19 Because the plaintiffs had not drawn
any distinction between the wholesale and retail functions of Dompier
and Gull, the court focused exclusively on the wholesaling function per-
formed by Dompier. 2 ° It was understood that if the plaintiffs could not
prove a violation based on Dompier's activities as a wholesaler, before it
also began to engage in retailing, their claim could not be sustained. 2'
The Ninth Circuit recognized that suppliers like Texaco "are permit-
ted to use... functional discounts,"'" charging wholesalers less than
retailers, but then saddled Texaco with the unprecedented burden of
proving what it called a "quantitative justification" for such a dis-
count.123 The court stated that the test for a wholesale discount should
be whether it "compensate[s the] buyers for the distributional services
they perform."' 24 According to the Ninth Circuit, injury at the retail
level is established if wholesalers receive "a functional discount in excess
of the value of the services they perform, all or a portion of which they
thenpass on to the retailers they supply.' 25 Thus, a violation of Section
2(a) "may occur if (1) the discount [Dompier] received was not cost-
based and (2) all or a portion of it was passed on ... to customers...
who competed with Hasbrouck."'' 26
In essence, the Ninth Circuit adopted a cost-justification test. But un-
like the cost-justification defense under section 2(a) of the Robinson-Pat-
man Act, which turns on the seller's costs (and derives from the text of
the statute itself), this cost-justification test for wholesaler discounts
hinged on the buyer's costs in providing the services performed. 27 It is
notoriously difficult for sellers to calculate their own costs for providing
trial to conform with the analysis of J. Truett Payne. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 663
F.2d 930, 932-33 (9th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 828 (1982).
117. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 254041 (1990).
118. See id. at 2541.
119. See Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1039-40 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110
S. Ct. 2535 (1990).
120. See id. at 1038-41.
121. Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 634 F. Supp. 34, 36-37 (E.D. Wash. 1985), off'd, 830
F.2d 1513 (9th Cir.), superceded, 842 F.2d 1034 (9th Cir. 1987).
122. Hasbrouck, 842 F.2d at 1038.
123. Hasbrouck v. Texaco Inc., 842 F.2d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 1987), aff'd, 110 S. Ct.
2535 (1990). The court pointed to evidence that Dompier had "passed on" part of the
discount it had received from Texaco to the retailers it supplied. See id. It also accepted
plaintiffs' proof that "in order to stay in business, gasoline retailers needed a profit margin
in the neighborhood of ten cents per gallon; yet, service stations operated or supplied by
Dompier often sold gasoline at retail prices that were only two to three cents higher than
the price that Hasbrouck paid to Texaco." Id.
124. Id. at 1038.
125. Id. at 1039 (emphasis added).
126. Id.
127. See id. at 1040-41.
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distribution services. It would be nearly impossible for the seller to pre-
dict the buyer's costs of providing such services.
Texaco successfully petitioned for certiorari. 2 ' The Supreme Court
affirmed the outcome of the case, but rejected the Ninth Circuit's formu-
lation of the law, saying instead that "we agree with the basic thrust of
Texaco's argument."12 9 Writing for a six-Justice majority, Justice Ste-
vens modified the Ninth Circuit's cost-justification test, adopting a more
flexible test of what the Court termed "reasonable reimbursement."
This test is based on either the supplier's savings or the wholesaler's
costs.1 30 In essence, "[a] supplier need not satisfy the rigorous require-
ments of the cost justification defense in order to prove that a particular
functional discount is reasonable and accordingly did not cause any sub-
stantial lessening of competition between a wholesaler's customers and
the supplier's direct customers."'' 31
The Court began its analysis by rejecting Texaco's threshold argument
that there had been no "discrimination" within the meaning of the
Robinson-Patman Act because the sales in question had not been made
to competing purchasers at the same level of trade. Reaffirming its previ-
ous holding in FTC v. Anheuser-Bush, Inc.,'32 the Court responded that
"a price discrimination within the meaning of [section] 2(a) 'is merely a
price difference.' ""33
The Court then turned to Texaco's argument that the price differen-
tials at issue had not injured competition. In the 1948 case FTC v. Mor-
ton Salt Co.,' 34 the Supreme Court had held that injury to competition
may be inferred simply from evidence that some purchasers had to pay
their supplier substantially more than their competitors paid. 135 Texaco
contended that this inference-the so-called Morton Salt inference--
"should not apply to differentials between prices charged to wholesalers
and [prices] charged to retailers."' 36 Texaco argued vigorously that it
would be inconsistent with antitrust policy to hold a manufacturer re-
sponsible for differentials between the prices it charges to retailers and
the prices its wholesalers charge to retailers, because this would require a
manufacturer to control its customers' resale prices. 137
The Court agreed, quoting at length from the celebrated 1955 Report
128. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 109 S. Ct. 3154 (1989) (petition for certiorari
granted). The United States filed a brief as amicus curiae on behalf of Texaco, and thirty
five states filed a brief on behalf of the Hasbrouck group. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck,
110 S. Ct. 2535, 2538 (1990).
129. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. at 2538 (emphasis added).
130. See id. at 2547.
131. Id. at 2545.
132. 363 U.S. 536 (1960).
133. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2544 (1990) (quoting FTC v.
Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 363 U.S. 536, 549 (1960)).
134. 334 U.S. 37 (1948).
135. See id. at 45.
136. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. at 2544.
137. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2544 (1990).
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of the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust
Laws (of which Justice Stevens was a member). That Report
recommended
that suppliers granting functional discounts either to single-function or
to integrated buyers should not be held responsible for any conse-
quences of their customers' pricing tactics. Price cutting at the resale
level is not in fact, and should not be held in law, 'the effect of' a
differential that merely accords due recognition and reimbursement for
actual marketing functions.
138
The Court reasoned that, unlike the situation arising where a supplier
discriminates between two competing retailers at the same level, an-
ticompetitive effects upon the customers of wholesalers "may not be pre-
sumed automatically in every functional discount setting, and, indeed,
one would expect that most functional discounts will be legitimate dis-
counts which do not cause harm to competition." 
139
Not all functional discounts, however, qualify as "legitimate." As the
Court stated: "[a]t the least, a functional discount that constitutes a rea-
sonable reimbursement for the purchasers' actual marketing functions
will not violate the Act. When a functional discount is legitimate, the
inference of injury to competition recognized in the Morton Salt case will
simply not arise." 1" Thus, while the Court did not explicitly accept Tex-
aco's argument14 that the Morton Salt inference of competitive injury
should never apply to functional discounts, it fashioned a rule under
which injury to competition is established if there is proof that a func-
tional discount does not constitute reasonable reimbursement. Arguably,
there is no inference left to Morton Salt. All that remains is a matter of
proof.
Having won the war with the Ninth Circuit and having persuaded the
Supreme Court to adopt a more rational rule for functional discounts,
Texaco. lost this particular and unique battle with the Hasbrouck
group-unique because the facts were driven largely by the presence of
federal price controls. 42 The Supreme Court found "no substantial evi-
dence indicating that the discounts to Gull and Dompier constituted a
reasonable reimbursement for the value to Texaco of their actual market-
ing functions." ' 43 Noting that "not every functional discount is entitled
to a judgment of legitimacy," the Court reasoned that "it will sometimes
be possible to produce evidence showing that a particular functional dis-
138. Id. at 2545 (quoting Report of Attorney Generals' National Committee to Study
the Antitrust Laws 208 (1955)). The Court generally agreed with this assessment, stating
that a "supplier need not satisfy the rigorous requirements of the cost justification" test.
Id.
139. Id. at 2550.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. This argument was also advanced by the Government as amicus. See id. at 2544.
142. See Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2540 nn.4, 5 (1990).
143. Id. at 2546.
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count caused a price discrimination of the sort the Act prohibits.'"
The Court held that the concept of "due recognition and reimburse-
ment" for actual marketing functions "would not countenance a func-
tional discount completely untethered to either the supplier's savings or
the wholesaler's costs."14 Stated positively, the Court suggests that a
functional discount is legitimate if it provides reasonable reimbursement
for either the supplier's savings or the wholesaler's costs-whichever can
reasonably be estimated. In Hasbrouck, the Court held that there was
proof of neither.
The Court noted that the evidence provided an illustration of the so-
called "scrambled functions" performed by distributors that operate on
both a wholesale and a retail level. The Court observed that instances of
such a scrambled existence have "frequently signaled the illegitimacy...
of what is alleged to be a permissible functional discount." '146 This is
somewhat confusing because the narrow issue being addressed was the
legality of the discount provided to Dompier at the time that it was func-
tioning entirely as a wholesaler, that is, unscrambled. But the Court did
not confine its observations to that aspect of the facts. Rather, it pointed
out that "[b]oth Gull and Dompier received the full discount on all their
purchases even though most of their volume was resold directly to con-
sumers."147 The Court inferred from this that "[t]he extra margin on
those sales obviously enabled them to price aggressively in both their re-
tail and their wholesale marketing."1 48
The ability of Dompier and Gull to pass on their discounts would not
have been obvious, however, if there had been evidence that Gull and
Dompier had shouldered significant costs normally attributed to whole-
saling. The real key was not that Dompier and Gull were engaging in
retailing, but that it appeared from the record that they never spent sig-
nificant resources on wholesaling. The Court seems to have been per-
suaded by the findings that Gull's only expense relating to storage or
transport was the operation of a couple of trucks, 149 and that all of Dom-
pier's expenses for transport were separately compensated with an addi-
tional hauling allowance. 50
Because Dompier's customers, and Dompier and Gull themselves,
were competing with the Hasbrouck group's service stations, and were
enjoying an "extra margin," the Court concluded that the "presumption
of adverse effect on competition recognized in the Morton Salt case [was]
appropriate." 51 Thus, "any presumption of legality that would other-
144. Id. at 2550-51 (emphasis added).
145. Id. at 2546 (emphasis added).
146. Id. at 2550.
147. Id.
148. Id. (emphasis added).
149. "Dompier was separately compensated for its hauling function, and neither Gull
nor Dompier maintained any significant storage facilities." Id. at 2546.
150. See id. at 2550.
151. Id.
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wise apply to their wholesale sales" was rebutted) 52 In other words,
because the plaintiffs demonstrated that the functional discounts in this
case did not constitute a reasonable reimbursement, injury to competi-
tion was established.
Having held against Texaco on liability, the Court was careful not to
send the wrong signal on the rule it adopted. The Court explicitly cau-
tioned that anticompetitive effects "surely may not be presumed automat-
ically in every functional discount setting,"15 3 and explained that a
successful plaintiff must "produce evidence showing that a particular
functional discount caused a price discrimination of the sort the Act pro-
hibits." Thus, a functional discount "that constitutes a reasonable re-
imbursement for the purchasers' actual marketing functions will not
violate the Act. When a functional discount is legitimate," ' the Morton
Salt inference of injury to competition-to the extent it survives-will
not arise.
Recall that where all customers are at the same level, Morton Salt sim-
ply requires evidence that some purchasers had to pay substantially more
than their competitors over a significant period. '56 So who bears the bur-
den of proof on the reasonableness of the reimbursement where func-
tional discounts to customers at different levels are involved? The Court
referred to a "presumption of legality" that normally applies to func-
tional discounts, and held that "[w]hen... anticompetitive effects are
proved ... they are covered by the Act."' 57 Consequently, the rule
against presuming anticompetitive effects in functional discounts over-
rides the automatic triggering of the Morton Salt inference. Thus, where
a functional discount is involved, a plaintiff must prove not only the
existence of the price difference, but also the unreasonableness of the
discount.
The question left open after Hasbrouck, however, is how to calculate
what is and what is not a "reasonable" discount. Hasbrouck makes clear
that if the plaintiff can establish that the favored customer was not per-
forming any wholesaling functions, and was actually selling to consumers
solely as a retailer, then providing a wholesaler's discount to that cus-
tomer would not be reasonable and would create an illegal price discrimi-
nation. Most cases involving "scrambled" distributors, however, are not
as simple as the Court found this one to be. Where a distributor provides
legitimate wholesale services and also sells at retail, what would a plain-
tiff have to show in order to prove that a discount provided to that dis-
tributor did not represent "reasonable reimbursement" for the wholesale
services?
152. Id.
153. Id. (emphasis added).
154. Id. at 2550-51.
155. Id. at 2550.
156. See FTC v. Morton Salt Co., 334 U.S. 37, 45 (1948).
157. Texaco Inc. v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535, 2551 (1990) (emphasis added).
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The Court offers two yardsticks for measuring the reasonableness of
the functional discount: the supplier's savings and the distributor's
costs.158 To satisfy its burden of proof, a plaintiff apparently must prove
that the wholesaler discount did not provide reasonable reimbursement
either for the seller's savings or for the buyer's costs. But does this mean
that a plaintiff in each case needs to prove the amount of the wholesale
discount, the amount of the seller's savings and the amount of the buyer's
costs in order to establish a prima facie case? Or is it enough that a
plaintiff prove the amount of the discount and either the amount of the
seller's savings or the buyer's costs, and thereby shift the burden of proof
to the other side?
The opinion leaves this and other questions unanswered. In discussing
"reasonable reimbursement," the Court took pains to emphasize that it
was not requiring mathematical "exactitude" or "rigorous account-
ing,"' 9 but failed to explain exactly when and why a reimbursement
becomes unreasonable. For example, is a discount that is twice as great
as the seller's or the buyer's costs of providing the wholesale services
unreasonable? Certainly a distributor is entitled to earn some margin of
profit for wholesale services-why else would anyone become a whole-
saler? The Court also failed to address the impact of a course of dealing
between the supplier and the wholesaler. Should it make a difference
whether the supplier has a historical basis for knowing the costs of
wholesaling services with some certainty? Should there be more leeway
in situations where suppliers have had little experience on which to base
the amount of the discount?
When establishing or changing a functional discount, the prudent
seller will estimate what the wholesaling services are worth to it-what it
would have to pay an independent contractor to perform those services.
158. In the Doubleday case, the Federal Trade Commission held that there is no injury
to competition where a buyer receives a discount that compensates it for the costs of
additional services performed for the benefit of the seller. See In re Doubleday & Co., 52
F.T.C. 169, 209 (1955). In the Mueller case the Federal Trade Commission held that a
discount is improper to the extent it compensates a particular buyer for services that
benefit not only the seller, but the buyer as well. See In re Mueller Co., 60 F.T.C. 120,
127-28 (1962). In the Boise Cascade case the Commission embraced the Mueller rule,
only to have its decision overturned by the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit on the
ground that competitive injury had not been proved. See Boise Cascade Corp. v. F.T.C.,
107 F.T.C. 76 (1986), vacated, 837 F.2d 1127 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
In Hasbrouck, the Supreme Court did not need to resolve the Doubleday-Mueller
struggle because the issue to be decided was limited to discounts provided to a buyer that
sells at a different level than other buyers. See Texaco v. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. 2535,
2547-48 (1990).
159. Hasbrouck, 110 S. Ct. at 2547 n.21. The Hasbrouck Court specifically rejected
what it called "the requirement of exactitude which might be inferred from [the dictum of
the Federal Trade Commission's 1955 decision in In re Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. 169,
209 (1955),] that a functional discount offered to a buyer 'should not exceed the cost of
that part of the function he actually performs on that part of the goods for which he
performs it.'" Id. (quoting Doubleday & Co., 52 F.T.C. at 209). The Court explained
that "a causation defense in a functional discount case does not demand the rigorous
accounting associated with a cost justification defense." Id.
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Alternatively, the seller could estimate what costs its customers are in-
curring when they provide those services, including a reasonable return.
If the amount of the functional discount bears a reasonable relationship
to either of those estimates, this should satisfy the Supreme Court's stan-
dard. There is no one method for making these estimates, and the Court
intentionally avoided limiting the calculation to any particular formula.
It is also worth noting that in many industries wholesalers sell to any and
all retailers, in which case no retailer stands to be injured from functional
discounts and there can be no injury to competition.
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Kennedy, filed a separate concurring
opinion asserting that functional discounts are prohibited by the text of
the Robinson-Patman Act regardless of whether they are "reasonable"
under some judge-made standard.1" Justice Scalia further stated that he
did not believe that a functional discount could be "reasonable" unless it
actually met the requirements of the cost-justification defense. 6
Hasbrouck may not signal a resurgence of Robinson-Patman litigation,
but it does serve as a reminder that the law cannot be ignored. The bot-
tom line is that the Supreme Court checked what would have been a very
disruptive ruling from the Ninth Circuit. Under the Supreme Court's
framework, suppliers can sell to their wholesalers at lower prices than
they sell to their retailers if the wholesalers are providing some genuine
wholesaler services and the discount they enjoy is "reasonable." If com-
panies designated as "wholesalers" are actually performing other func-
tions, however, close scrutiny is advised. Likewise, if the amount of the
discount appears unreasonably large, the supplier should investigate why
it is being provided. Absent a legitimate reason for such a large discount,
its effect on the market at the retail level may make it the target of
litigation.
PRIVATE DIVESTITURE ACTIONS: CALIFORNIA V.
AMERICAN STORES CO.
by Richard M. Steuer 162
IN today's controversy over the direction of antitrust, nothing has been
more hotly debated than the subject of merger control. For the most
part, the Supreme Court has remained above the fray, taking only a sin-
gle merger case during the entire Reagan Administration. In that case,
160. See id. at 2555.
161. He pointed out that the requirements of that defense "are not the rigors of mathe-
matical precision, but the rigors of proof that the amount of the discount and the amount
of the cost saving are close enough that the difference cannot produce any substantial
lessening of competition." Id. (emphasis in original).
Justice White concurred in the result, asserting that this was not an appropriate case in
which to make pronouncements on functional discounts because the discounts at issue
would not qualify under any definition. Id. at 2553.
162. Partner, Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler, New York.
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the 1986 decision in Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colorado, Inc.,163 the
Court held that a company has no standing to challenge a merger be-
tween two of its competitors on the ground that it will face tougher com-
petition if the merger takes place.164
In other quarters, of course, mergers became one of the liveliest topics
of the 1980s. The arrival of the Reagan Administration in 1981 signalled
a decidedly restrained approach to the enforcement of antitrust laws di-
rected at mergers. The number and magnitude of mergers grew mark-
edly, while the likelihood of a challenge from Washington diminished
perceptibly.165 This development prompted several state attorneys gen-
eral to initiate their own merger investigations in instances where they
were unsatisfied with federal antitrust enforcement, and the states began
to challenge mergers in court. Some cases were filed in state court under
state antitrust laws; 166 others were filed in federal court under the federal
antitrust laws. 167 Acting through the National Association of Attorneys
General, the states also adopted a premerger notification program similar
to the federal program established by the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act in 1976,
but on a voluntary rather than a mandatory basis.' 61
This grassroots approach drew criticism from those who believe that
effective merger policy requires coordinated enforcement at the federal
level, not a balkanized environment in which merging companies can
face challenges from the federal government, the fifty states and the Dis-
trict of Columbia-all in just this one country.' 69 The states, on the
other hand, argued that they had to be free to proceed against consolida-
163. 479 U.S. 104 (1986).
164. See id. at 116. However, the Court declined an invitation from the Justice De-
partment, appearing as amicus, to adopt a blanket rule denying companies standing to
challenge any acquisitions by their competitors on the basis of anticipated price cutting
by the merging companies. Cargill not only was the Court's only merger decision during
the Reagan Administration; it was its only pronouncement on mergers since 1977, when
in Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977), the Court held that
a plaintiff in a merger case must prove "antitrust injury" in order to recover monetary
damages. See id. at 489.
165. See Fox & Sullivan, Antitrust - Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We Go-
ing?, 62 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 936, 948-49 (1987); Handler, Is Antitrust's Centennial A Time for
Obsequies Or for Renewed Faith in Its National Policy?, 10 Cardozo L. Rev. 1933, 1936
n.13 (1989).
166. See, eg., State v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 697 S.W.2d 677, 678 (Tex. Ct. App.
1985) (state action to divest acquisition under state law counterpart to section 7 of the
Clayton Act; no prior HSR review by federal agencies).
167. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Wyco New Haven, Inc., 1990-1 Trade Cas. (CCH)
69,024 (D. Conn. 1990) (consent decree); Massachusetts v. Campeau Corp., 1988-1 Trade
Cas. (CCH) 68,093 (D. Mass. 1988) (consent decree); City of Pittsburgh v. May Dep't
Stores Co., 1986-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) 67,304 (W.D. Pa. 1986) (state and city action
resulting in divestiture of local store following FTC no-action decision).
168. See National Association of Attorneys General Voluntary Pre-Merger Disclosure
Compact, 53 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) 943, 943-44 (1987).
169. See Crane, The Future Direction ofAntitrust, 56 Antitrust L.J. 3, 9 (1987); Oliver,
The Role of the Federal Trade Commission in Formulating and Implementing Competi-
tion Policy, 34 Fed. B. News & J. 200, 204 (June 1987).
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tions that threatened their local economies, whether or not federal agen-
cies saw fit to act.' 70
At the same time, private merger litigation began to command increas-
ing attention. Notwithstanding Cargill, a number of plaintiffs succeeded
in establishing standing to challenge acquisitions by their competitors.
For example, in the 1987 case Tasty Baking Co. v. Ralston Purina,
Inc.,17' a snack cake manufacturer secured an injunction blocking the
merger of two of its rivals on the ground that the combination would
foreclose its own products from the limited space available on retailers'
shelves.' 72 In 1988, in Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak Co.,'3 a photo
processor obtained a preliminary injunction blocking the acquisition of a
competing processor by Kodak, 74 although the court of appeals quickly
reversed on the strength of Cargill, holding that the plaintiff was really
complaining about the threat of greater competition. 17
In 1989, in RC. Bigelow, Ina v. Unilever N. V,1"6 a manufacturer of
herbal tea successfully obtained an injunction blocking the merger of its
two major competitors. The Second Circuit held that a company should
have standing to challenge a merger between its two competitors where
market shares and other evidence suggested that the merging firms would
be able to foreclose the company from access to its customers.'" Finally,
in Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A.," 8 also decided in
1989, the Second Circuit held that a gold mining company was entitled
to an injunction blocking the takeover of its major shareholder by an-
other mining company that threatened to use its voting power to curtail
the plaintiff's competing operations. 179
Thus, by 1989, states and private parties had undertaken no small
amount of merger enforcement of their own. Although many of these
cases sought injunctions to block proposed mergers, others were brought
too late for that, and consequently sought divestiture of completed merg-
ers.' 80 The law was split on the right of a private party-which for this
170. See Constantine, Antitrust Federalism, 29 Washburn LJ. 163, 179-81 (1990).
171. 653 F. Supp. 1250 (E.D. Pa. 1987).
172. See id. at 1273, 1277.
173. 687 F. Supp. 1061 (N.D. Tex.), rev'd, 842 F.2d 95 (5th Cir.), cert denied, 486
U.S. 1023 (1988).
174. See id. at 1072.
175. See Phototron Corp. v. Eastman Kodak, 842 F.2d 95, 100-102 (5th Cir.), cert
denied, 486 U.S. 1023 (1988). See generally Note, Competitor Standing to Challenge a
Merger of Rivals, 75 Cal. L. Rev. 2057, 2057 (1987) (arguing that Cargill does not pre-
clude antitrust suits by competitors).
176. 867 F.2d 102 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989).
177. See id. at 111.
178. 871 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), cert. dismissed, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
179. See id. at 254-58. The Supreme Court denied petitions for certiorari in both Bige-
low and Consolidated Gold Fields, so it is impossible to know whether the Court would
have agreed that Cargill was distinguishable in those two cases. See Thomas J. Lipton,
Inc. v. RC. Bigelow, Inc., 110 S. Ct. 64 (1989); Minorco v. Consolidated Gold Fields
PLC, 110 S. Ct. 29 (1989).
180. See cases cited supra notes 166, 167.
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purpose included a state-to seek divestiture, with the Ninth Circuit
holding that there was no such right and the First Circuit holding that
there was.""1
It was against this backdrop of state and private litigation that the
Supreme Court once again turned its attention to a merger suit in Cali-
fornia v. American Stores Co."s2 In a 9-0 decision, the Court held that
private parties have the right to seek divestiture as a form of relief under
the federal antitrust laws.
18 3
The history of the case is unusual. American Stores operated super-
markets in forty states, including California, where its Alpha Beta divi-
sion was the fourth largest chain. In March 1988, it initiated a tender
offer to acquire the stock of Lucky Stores, the largest chain in California,
for $2.5 billion, and so notified the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC").
It provided information on the merger both to the FTC and to the state
of California. The FTC conducted an investigation and entered into a
consent agreement with American under which American agreed to
divest thirty-seven of its California stores and to hold the Lucky assets
and operations separate until the divestiture was complete. 1 4 With the
FTC's approval, American then proceeded to acquire the stock of Lucky
Stores. Complying with the consent agreement, however, it kept the
business operations of the two companies separate. About three months
later, after a public comment period, FTC approval of the acquisition
became final; this occurred about five months after the original notifica-
181. The Sixth Circuit adopted the Ninth Circuit's position, while the First Circuit's
holding found support in decisions of the Third Circuit and several district courts. Com-
pare International Telephone and Telegraph v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp.,
518 F.2d 913, 920 (9th Cir. 1975) (no-divestiture remedy in private action under section
16 of Clayton Act); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagen of America, Inc. 532 F.2d 674, 692
(9th Cir. 1976) (same), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 940 (1976); Bosse v. Crowell Collier &
MacMillan, 565 F.2d 602, 607 (9th Cir. 1977) (same) and Arthur S. Langenderfer Inc. v.
S.E. Johnson Co., 729 F.2d 1050, 1060 (6th Cir.) (following Ninth Circuit in denying
divestiture remedy to private plaintiff), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984); with Cia. Pe-
trolera Caribe, Inc. v. Arco Caribbean, Inc., 754 F.2d 404, 414 (1st Cir. 1985) (conclud-
ing that section 16 of Clayton Act recognizes divestiture as remedy in private action);
NBO Industries Treadway Companies, Inc. v. Brunswick Corp., 523 F.2d 262, 278-79
(3d Cir. 1975) (endorsing the Ninth Circuit's reasoning, but refusing to rule on the appli-
cability of divestiture generally because, on the facts, less drastic relief was available),
rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S.
477 (1977); Fuchs Sugars & Syrups, Inc. v. Amstar Corp., 402 F. Supp. 636, 640
(S.D.N.Y. 1975) ("divestiture is a potential remedy for private parties injured by viola-
tions of the Clayton Act"); Julius Nasso Concrete Corp. v. DIC Concrete Corp., 467 F.
Supp. 1016, 1025 (S.D.N.Y. 1979) (divestiture available for Clayton Act § 7 violation);
Bay Guardian Co. v. Chronicle Publishing Co., 340 F. Supp. 76, 81-82 (N.D. Cal. 1972)
(same); Credit Bureau Reports, Inc. v. Retail Credit Co., 358 F. Supp. 780, 797 (S.D.
Tex. 1971) (divestiture permitted to private parties under § 16, but should be avoided
where other remedies are available), aff'd, 476 F.2d 989, 992 (5th Cir. 1973); Burkhead v.
Phillips Petroleum Co., 308 F. Supp. 120, 126-27 (N.D. Cal. 1970) (same); Julius M.
Ames Co. v. Bostitch, Inc., 240 F. Supp. 521, 526 (S.D.N.Y. 1965) (same).
182. 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
183. See id. at 1855, 1866-67.
184. See id. at 1856.
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tion had been filed.' 85 The very next day, the Attorney General of Cali-
fornia, proceeding both on his own behalf and as parens patriae on behalf
of California consumers, filed a suit in federal court in Los Angeles, com-
plaining that the acquisition violated section 7 of the Clayton Act and
section 1 of the Sherman Act. 186 The state sought a preliminary injunc-
tion requiring American to continue holding the Lucky assets separate
pending a final adjudication, as well as a permanent injunction requiring
divestiture under section 16 of the Clayton Act. 87
The district court granted a preliminary injunction, finding that Cali-
fornia had demonstrated a prima facie violation of section 7V188 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals set the injunction aside, however, on the
ground that it amounted to an impermissible divestiture.'89 The Ninth
Circuit found that because the merger of American and Lucky had al-
ready taken place, notwithstanding the fact that the Lucky assets were
being held separate under the FTC consent order, the district court's so-
called "hold separate" order really amounted to an indirect form of di-
vestiture. On the authority of its 1975 decision in International Tele-
phone and Telegraph Corp. v. General Telephone & Electronics Corp., 9
the circuit court held that divestiture was not available as a remedy in a
private action.' 9 ' The state of California, suing on behalf of state con-
sumers, was the equivalent of a private party under the federal antitrust
laws, and thus subject to the same limitations.
California immediately applied to Justice O'Connor for a stay ex-
tending the district court's injunction, which was granted.' 92 The
Supreme Court then granted certiorari to resolve the conflict between the
Ninth Circuit's ruling and the 1985 decision of the First Circuit in Cia.
Petrolera Caribe, Inc. v. ARCO Caribbean.193 In a unanimous decision,
the Court reversed the Ninth Circuit and remanded for further
proceedings. 194
The Court's opinion, authored by Justice Stevens, parsed the language
of section 16 of the Clayton Act, which authorizes private suits in equity.
185. California filed comments with the FTC arguing that the merger would be an-
ticompetitive and urging the FTC to withdraw its consent. Brief for Petitioner at 33,
California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. CL 1853 (1990). It also warned American
Stores itself that if the FTC did not remedy the state's concerns, the state might bring an
action under section 7 of the Clayton Act. See id. at 4.
186. Sde id. at 5.
187. See id.
188. See California v. American Stores Co., 697 F. Supp. 1125, 1135 (C.D. Cal. 1988).
189. See California v. American Stores Co., 872 F.2d 837, 845-46 (9th Cir. 1989), reV'd
in part, 110 S. Ct. 1853 (1990).
190. 518 F.2d 913 (9th Cir. 1975).
191. See id. at 920.
192. 110 S. Ct. 1 (1989).
193. 754 F.2d 404 (1st Cir. 1985). Caribe pre-dated Cargill, and there is some question
whether the underlying allegations in Caribe, brought by a competitor, would suffice
under the Cargill rule.
194. California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1855, 1867 (1990).
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First, the Court rejected American Stores' argument that because section
15 of the Clayton Act empowers the Government to "prevent and re-
strain ... violations,' "195 while section 16 simply authorizes private par-
ties to obtain "injunctive relief... against threatened loss or damage, "196
only section 15 permits divestiture. The Court refused to draw this dis-
tinction, and held that section 16 encompasses divestiture "just as
plainly" as does section 15.197 Indeed, the Court remarked that section
16 may actually be more expansive than section 15.198
The Court then went on to examine the legislative history of section
16, although it was careful to point out that it did not believe the statu-
tory language to be ambiguous on its face.' 99 American Stores argued
that when Congress enacted the Clayton Act in 1914, it drew a distinc-
tion between relief directed at conduct and relief directed at structure.20°
American further argued that at that same time Congress specifically re-
jected dissolution and divestiture as available remedies for private par-
ties. 201  The Supreme Court reviewed the legislative history itself,
concluding that although there is evidence that Congress never intended
to authorize outright dissolution as a private remedy, "divestiture," as
that term was understood at the time, was a far less drastic measure than
"dissolution. '20 2 The Court also rejected the notion that structural relief
was not intended for private suits, observing that in a case of this kind
"the distinction between conduct and structure ... is illusory, 20 3 be-
cause for all practical purposes a prohibitory injunction against the "con-
duct" of voting the stock of the acquired company would have exactly
the same effect as a mandatory "structural" order of divestiture. 2°4 The
Court concluded that section 16 "should be construed generously and
flexibly pursuant to principles of equity. ' ' 2 5 It held that a district judge
may "impose the most effective, usual and straightforward remedy to
rescind an unlawful purchase of stock [or] assets, ' 2 6 including
divestiture.
The Court cautioned, however, that simply because private litigants
may have the right to seek divestiture does not mean that divestiture
should be ordered in every instance in which the federal government it-
self would be entitled to such relief.2 7 "In a Government case the proof
of the violation of law may itself establish sufficient public injury to war-
195. Id. at 1858 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 25 (1988)).
196. Id. (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 26 (1988)).
197. Id. at 1859.
198. Id.
199. See id. at 1861-66.
200. See id. at 1863.
201. See id.
202. See id.
203. Id. at 1859-60.
204. See id.
205. Id. at 1866.
206. Id.
207. See id.
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years. In return, the Attorney General permitted American to keep the
rest of Lucky's 340 California stores, as well as 23 Alpha Beta stores in
southern California.2 1 5 The agreement did not restrict American Stores'
freedom to acquire additional properties in California. In fact, the Cali-
fornia Attorney General announced that he planned to recommend to
the FTC that it dissolve its own consent decree, which continued to limit
American's ability to make further acquisitions in the state.216
American Stores is important because it recognizes the right of states
and private parties to seek divestiture to remedy a merger that violates
the Clayton Act. If the Court had held otherwise, states would not be
able to bring suit under federal antitrust law to break up completed
mergers, even if they had no way of learning about a merger until after
its consummation. Likewise, private parties would not be able to seek
divestiture in federal court, even if they could establish standing to sue
under section 7.
Such a result would have forced states and private litigants to turn to
state courts and state antitrust law as an alternative. 1 7 This would have
raised two possibilities: (i) the federal courts would have prohibited pri-
vate divestiture suits under state law as well, or (ii) private divestiture
remedies would have become available only under state law, thus making
state merger law and state courts as important to shaping the nation's
economy as federal merger law and the federal courts.
The Supreme Court has held in several cases that state antitrust laws
are not preempted by federal antitrust laws,218 and has permitted the
application of state antitrust laws to interstate commerce notwithstand-
ing the Commerce Clause.219 But if the Supreme Court had held that
Congress did not intend for anyone but the federal Government to have
the right to seek divestiture, it would have opened the door to a preemp-
tion defense in cases seeking divestiture under state law.220 Alterna-
215. See Zwiebach, American Turns Attention Toward Reducing Its Debt, Supermarket
News, June 18, 1990, at 4.
216. See Zwiebach, American Gives Up Fight: Will Sell 152 Alpha Betas, Supermarket
News, May 21, 1990, at 1.
217. Indeed, the states have already turned to their own antitrust laws on several occa-
sions in efforts to obtain divestiture.
218. See California v. ARC America Corp., 109 S. Ct. 1661, 1665 (1989); Exxon Corp.
v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117, 133-34 (1978).
219. See ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 15, Antitrust Federalism: The Role
of State Law 10-11 (1988).
220. See, eg., Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, 284-85 (1972) (commerce clause precludes
use of state antitrust law in private action against organized baseball); California ex rel.
Van de Kamp v. Texaco Inc., 219 Cal. Rptr. 824, 829 (Ct. App. 1985) (by virtue of FTC
consent order, federal government occupied the field of a challenged acquisition, pre-
empting state law), aff'd on other grounds, 46 Cal. 3d 1147, 1151, 252 Cal. Rptr. 221,
222, 762 P.2d 385, 386 (1988) (California Supreme Court held that California antitrust
law did not reach mergers, so preemption issue need not be reached).
American argued that Congress intended the instrument of divestiture to be left exclu-
sively in the hands of federal enforcement agencies, relying on Continental Securities Co.
& Michigan Cent. R. Co., 16 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1926), cert. denied, 274 U.S. 741 (1927);
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rant relief."2 ° A private litigant, on the other hand, must establish
standing in every case. Moreover, a private litigant may face such equi-
table defenses as laches and unclean hands. The Court noted that these
defenses "may protect consummated transactions from belated attacks
by private parties when it would not be too late for the Government to
vindicate the public interest. ' 209
In a concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy confronted American's ar-
gument that permitting the filing of private suits for divestiture after the
parties to the transaction have filed premerger notification reports under
the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act,210 and after they actually have entered into a
consent agreement with the FTC approving the acquisition, would "re-
duce the Federal Government's negotiating strength and destroy the pre-
dictability that Congress sought to provide when it enacted [the Hart-
Scott-Rodino Act]."21 Justice Kennedy was sympathetic to this argu-
ment, but noted that there was nothing in the body of the Hart-Scott-
Rodino Act to support it. He observed that "[a]lthough Congress might
desire at some point to enact a strict rule prohibiting divestiture after a
negotiated settlement with the FTC, it has not done so yet."'2 12 He went
on to comment, however, that the Hart-Scott-Rodino Act nevertheless
"may bear upon the issue of laches. ' ' 213 "By establishing a time period
for review of merger proposals by the FTC," Justice Kennedy pointed
out, the Act "may lend a degree of objectivity to the laches
determination. 21 4
Within three weeks after the Supreme Court's decision was an-
nounced, and before the Ninth Circuit could settle the laches issue on
remand, however, American Stores entered into a consent agreement
with the California Attorney General. Under the agreement, American
agreed to divest 152 of its Alpha Beta stores in southern California, as
well as some related facilities and nine Lucky stores over a period of five
208. See id.
209. Id. at 1867.
210. 15 U.S.C. § 18a (1988).
211. California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1867 (1990) (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
212. Id. at 1868. But cf. Lieberman v. FTC, 771 F.2d 32, 40 (2d Cir. 1985) ("We
doubt if Congress would have intended to have the staffs of fifty state attorneys general
sitting as oversight committees reacting to Commission or Justice Department decisions
whether to block large-scale mergers of national or international significance"); Mattox v.
FTC, 752 F.2d 116, 122 (5th Cir. 1985) ("Because HSR only covers transactions likely to
affect the entire national economy, Congress may have wanted to centralize regulation of
such mergers in the FTC and the Justice Department.").
213. American Stores, 110 S. Ct. at 1868.
214. Id. Justice Kennedy noted that the State of California received a copy of Ameri-
can Stores' premerger notification filing more than a month before the FTC concluded its
settlement agreement. As Justice Kennedy put it, the State "elected not to act at that
time, but now seeks a divestiture which, the facts suggest, would upset labor agreements
and other matters influenced in important ways by the FTC proceeding." Id. "These
considerations," Justice Kennedy remarked, "should bear upon the ultimate disposition
of the case." Id.
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tively, if courts were to hold that allowing private divestiture under state
law would place too great a burden on interstate commerce, they could
have applied the bar of the Commerce Clause to such suits. " In either
case, no private divesture remedy would exist under federal or state law.
This would leave structural merger enforcement--except in the case of
purely intrastate matters-entirely in the hands of the Justice Depart-
ment and the FTC. Traditionally, this is exactly where the power to seek
divestiture has resided. After the experience of the Reagan Administra-
tion, however, states might have found such a situation difficult to accept
and would have lobbied hard for change.
On the other hand, if the Supreme Court had prohibited a private right
to seek divestiture under federal antitrust law, and such a right continued
under state law, the result would have been equally unsettling. Private
litigants would have been forced to bring divestiture actions only in state
court under state laws, foreclosing the prospect of coordinated multi-dis-
trict litigation in a single forum. Every time more than one state chose to
challenge an acquisition, multiple litigations in multiple forums under
multiple state laws would have resulted. Private challenges in multiple
forums would have led to similarly inefficient litigation. This chaotic re-
sult would have created as much of a backlash as foreclosing private di-
vestiture actions altogether. By allowing private parties to seek
divestiture, the American Stores decision defused this potentially explo-
sive situation.
While the decision was no bombshell, it was not without significance.
The issue of laches represents the most interesting aspect of the case.
American Stores relied heavily on the fact that California had launched
Graves v. Cambria Steel Co., 298 F. 761 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Venner v. Pennsylvania Steel
Co., 250 F. 292 (D.N.J. 1918).
It is true that in ARC America, the Supreme Court held that federal antitrust law does
not necessarily preempt state antitrust remedies that are broader than federal remedies-
but that was a different case. See ARC America, 109 S. Ct. at 1664-65. The ARC
America Court held that states can provide standing to indirect purchasers even though
federal courts do not provide such standing. See id. at 1667. The Court reasoned that
state and federal remedies are not mutually exclusive where an inconsistent state rule
would not undermine federal enforcement. But the Court emphasized that it would not
be contrary to congressional purposes for states to allow indirect purchasers to recover
under state antitrust laws. See id. at 1665-66.
In contrast, providing a private right to divestiture under state law where none exists
under federal law would completely undermine congressional intent to have exclusive
federal enforcement-assuming that the Court found this to have been the intent. Ac-
cordingly, had the Court been unprepared to allow a private right to divestiture under the
federal antitrust laws, that ruling could have eliminated a private right of divestiture
under state law as well.
221. See Edgar v. Mite Corp., 457 U.S. 624, 640 (1982); Flood v. Kuhn, 443 F.2d 264,
267-68 (2d Cir. 1971), aff'd, 407 U.S. 258, 285 (1972); Mechanical Rubber & Supply Co.
v. American Saw and Mfg. Co., 747 F. Supp. 1292, 1296 (C.D. II!. 1990); Partee v. San
Diego Chargers Football Co., 34 Cal. 3d 378, 385, 194 Cal. Rptr. 367, 372, 668 P.2d 674,
679 (1983), cerL denied, 466 U.S. 904 (1984); see also In re Wiring Device Antitrust
Litigation, 498 F. Supp 79, 85 (E.D.N.Y. 1980) (state itself confirmed application of its
antitrust laws to intrastate commerce).
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its own investigation well before the FTC's approval of the acquisition
became final, but failed to act until after the merger was effected.222 In
connection with the state's investigation, American voluntarily provided
the California Attorney General with all of the California documents and
information provided to the FTC. The Supreme Court did not ignore the
significance of this, and remanded for further proceedings (which never
actually took place). There is no doubt, however, that this kind of coop-
eration with state attorneys general would be pertinent to a laches de-
fense. If a state has early access to the relevant information, should it not
be required to act at the same time as the FTC and the Justice
Department?
Laches is a peculiar doctrine in the field of mergers. The Supreme
Court has not imposed strict time limits on merger challenges. For ex-
ample, in United States v. E.L Du Pont de Nemours & Co.,223 the
Supreme Court held that the Justice Department can seek divestiture as
much as thirty years after an acquisition has taken place.224 In Cop-
perweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.,225 the Court suggested that a
party can bring suit to challenge an acquisition any time after it takes
place "when an original anticompetitive purpose [becomes] evident from
the affiliated corporations' subsequent conduct. '226 Yet, given the enor-
mous burden and expense associated with the premerger notification pro-
cess, it makes considerable sense to require any party-federal, state or
private-to challenge a merger as soon as it is reported, provided that a
manifest threat to competition already exists. Section 7 of the Clayton
Act provides that a court may strike down a merger on the ground that
its effect "may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create
a monopoly. ' '227 More often than not, such a threat will be fully appar-
ent even as the merger is taking place.
This raises the question of whether a company should undertake vol-
untary state-level premerger notification. American Stores provided pre-
merger notification information to the state, only to be sued after the
FTC gave the green light. It was largely because the tender offer was
widely publicized, because the state was provided with ample informa-
tion in advance, and because there was an FTC hold-separate agreement
in effect that the state was able to obtain such effective relief. In a case
222. See California v. American Stores Co., 110 S. Ct. 1853, 1867-68 (1990) (Kennedy,
J., concurring).
223. 353 U.S. 586 (1957).
224. See id. at 597-98. The Court found that a suit could be brought at "any time
when the acquisition threatens to ripen into a prohibited effect." Id. at 597. Thus, the
Court held that the Government could proceed "at any time that an acquisition may be
said with reasonable probability to contain a threat that it may lead to a restraint of
commerce or tend to create a monopoly of a line of commerce." Id.
225. 467 U.S. 752 (1984).
226. Id. at 761. The Court stated that "[a] corporation's initial acquisition of control
will always be subject to scrutiny under § 1 of the Sherman Act and § 7 of the Clayton
Act." Id. at 777.
227. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1988) (emphasis added).
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where no hold-separate agreement exists, and the state first learns about
an acquisition and has to subpoena documents after the FTC's approval
becomes effective, the chances that the state could still obtain injunctive
relief are significantly reduced.
On the other hand, the sooner states receive notice of a planned acqui-
sition, the sooner they must act under the doctrine of laches. The Ameri-
can Stores decision will encourage judges to consider the degree and
timing of cooperation with state premerger notification programs in de-
ciding whether state enforcers have acted with sufficient speed. Thus, a
party that has provided voluntary premerger notification to the state will
have a stronger laches argument than one that has not.28
Of course, the prospect of federal, state and private challenges are only
some of the obstacles to major mergers. Premerger notification does not
stop in Washington and the state capitals. It often progresses through
Canada, the European Community and other parts of the world." 9
Ironically, since the beginning of the Reagan Administration, the
number of potential impediments to completing a major acquisition has
mushroomed to the point that antitrust can easily eclipse all other issues
once again, just as it did in years past. Although American Stores has
prevented a major struggle between the state and federal governments, by
keeping states in the divestiture business it has guaranteed that the pro-
cess of completing a merger will be more tortured than ever.
Finally, the impact of the American Stores case has been lessened
somewhat by the new atmosphere of cooperation that has been develop-
ing between the federal enforcement agencies and the states. The Justice
Department and Federal Trade Commission have become appreciably
more active in opposing mergers since the arrival of the Bush Adminis-
tration, reducing the pressure for concurrent enforcement on the part of
the states.23 ° Also, state and federal enforcers have entered into their
own informal division of efforts, whereby federal authorities are taking
the lead on mergers while states are devoting greater attention to such
228. It has been suggested that the Supreme Court's endorsement of a private right to
divestiture will raise the settlement value of private merger litigation. A particularly diffi-
cult issue in this regard is how to settle a private suit that seeks divestiture, particularly
one brought by a competitor. The Justice Department and Federal Trade Commission
frequently negotiate settlements short of complete divestiture, but it hardly seems desira-
ble for two competitors to negotiate over the breadth of a merger that one of them is
entering into. Courts will need to pay particular attention to a proposed settlement of
this kind, to prevent the settlement process from becoming more anticompetitive than the
original merger itself. Enforcement agencies that decide not to challenge particular
mergers may feel compelled to file amicus briefs commenting on private settlement
proposals.
229. See Hawk, European Economic Community Merger Regulation, 59 Antitrust L.J.
457, 458 (1991); Goldman, Bilateral Aspects of Canadian Competition Policy, 57 Antitrust
L.J. 401, 410 (1988).
230. See Pfunder, Developments in Merger Law and Enforcement 1989-90, 59 Antitrust
L.J. 319 (1991).
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areas as vertical restraints.231 As long as this understanding continues,
the right of the states to seek divestiture will have theoretical interest, but
limited practical effect.
231. See Brockmeyer, State Antitrust Enforcement Enters a New Decade-Its Direc-
tions and Challenges, 59 Antitrust L.J. 26, 33 (1990).
